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ARGUMEW1'
Appellants/Defendcint and Counterclaim and Cross ,
Plaintiffs,
Co.

American Coin Portfolios,

Inc. and Oakwood

11,-

Mariut

(hereinafter collectively referred to as "American"),

through their attorneys of record,

submit this Brief in Reply

to Respondents' Brief on appeal (Respondents are hereinafter
referred to as "Jones").
I.

L. H. INVESTMENT HAS NEVER FULFILLE.D ITS COVENANTS AND
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ORIGINAL OR REVISED COMMODITIF,S
PURCEASE AGREEMENTS AND AMERICAN HAS RETAIUED ITS
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Point I of the Jones'

Brief asserts that "L. H.

Investment strictly performed its covenants and obligations
under the original Commodities Purchase Agreement."

The

Jones Brief, however,

never confronts the critical facts or

the controlling law.

Jones never disputes that American

advanced $200,000.00 to L. H.

Investment in September 1980,

that the debt was properly secured by the Trust Deed, and
that the debt of $200,000.00 was never repaid to American in
any form by anyone.

Jones merely argues that because the

January 1981 Revised Agreement and Note were executed,
the debt and the Trust Deed security were extinguished.
followinsi cases,

cited .for the_ following controlling

that
'1'1:2

in Aiilerican's Brief,

are never discussed,

or even cited in Jones'
1)
230 N.W.

In Oakman v.

Brief:

Hurd Lumber

&

Woodwork Co.,

921 (Mich. 1930), the court was confronted

with facts virtually identical to those here.

The

plaintiff was an intervening purchaser of the
property who took his deed subject to a mortgage, as
did Jones in the present case take his deed
expressly subject to the Trust Deed of American.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that
defendant's acceptance of substituted renewal notes
discharged the mortgage, holding:

"No change in the

form of the evidence, or the mode or time of
payment--nothing short of actual payment of the
debt, or an express release--will operate to
discharge the mortgage."
accord Smith v. Thomas,
2)
note,

Id.

245 P. 399, 401 (Idaho 1926).

When a note is given in renewal of another

it does not raise the presumption of

extinguishment of the debt.
v.

(emphasis added);

Interwest Film Corp.,

Marking Systems,

Inc.

567 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah

1977); see Utah Code Annotated§ 70A-3-802.

It must

clearly appear that it was the intention of the

-2-

parties to extinguish the debt rc•1nes•er1t ed t•y
original note.
Utah 543,
Kappos,
3)

171 P.

t

1,,,

Interstate Trust Co.
515,

90 Utah 300,

517-15 (1918); accorcJ,
61 P.2d Gl3,

Gra_y_

GJS (193G).

"The renewal agreement was sufficient not

only to revive the indebtedness but to renew the
original mortgage as well."

Easton v. Ash,

116 P.2d

433, 437 (Cal. 1941); see Waynesboro Nat. Bank v.
Smith,

145 S.E.

302,

305-06 (Va. 1928).

Jones does not address the fundamental distinction
between the underlying debt--the $200,000.00--and the
evidence of the debt--the note or renewal note.

The Trust

Deed secures the underlying debt, and a change in the form of
the evidence of indebtedness is irrelevant.

This proposition

is amplified in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 461:
Where a note secured by a mortgage is
taken up, at or before its maturity, and a
new or renewal note substituted for it, the
mortgage continues as a security for the
debt in its new form and there is no change
in the rights or remedies of the mortgagee
unless there is an actual agreement or
mutual intention of the parties that the
mortgage shall be discharged, or the debt
regarded as paid, by the new note, or that
the new note shall not be included within
the security of the mortgage; and the one
who claims such an agreement or
understanding has the burden of proving it.
(Emphasis added).
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111e
,"

so•r1t

Spuit1n<J

most recent and directly controlling case on the

facts is First Security Bank of Utah v. Proudfit
Goods Co.,

522 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976), which is

Jiscussed in detail in Americans' Brief at 14-16.

In

Proudfit an intervening lienholder claimed that the banks
acceptance of a renewal note in an increased debt amount
constituted payment of the underlying debt and therefore
released the original Trust Deed security.
reJected that argument.

This court

In Jones' Brief at 14, Jones states

that Proudfit "would be applicable to this case if L. H.
Investment had not performed under the original contract and
had obtained an extension of time in which to perform."

L.

H. Investment failed to pay the debt to American and executed
the Revised Agreement and Note to extend the debt, which is
the identical failure of performance as occurred in Proudfit,
when the original note was substituted for a renewal note.
II.

THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AS WELL AS THE
CONTENTS OF ALL EXECUTED DOCUMENTS, INDICATES THE
CLEAR AND EXPRESSED INTENT TO EXTEND THE DEBT AND THE
TRUST DEED SECURITY INTEREST WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE
JANUARY REVISED AGREEMENT AND NOTE.
In light of the undisputed fact that the underlying

IPtir
'1t

to American has never been paid, Jones can only prevail if
clearly appears that it was the intention of the parties

-4-

that the execution of the new note a11d the cdncel lat ion of ,,,
old note should extinguish the debt represented by the olJ
note."
trustor,

Proudfit,

supra, at 124.

Because L. H.

Investment, '

admits the validity and priority of the American TrusL

Deed, Jones,

at 9-12 of his Brief, argues that the actual

intent of the parties to extend the debt and security interest
is irrelevant as to a third party, and Jones asserts that the
intent of L. H.

Investment and American must be drawn from the

January 1981 written agreements.

Jones Brief then argues at

12-15 that the January Revised Agreement and Note demonstrate
an intent to extinguish the prior debt at that time.

Jones'

conclusion that the written documents show an intent to
extinguish the prior debt is patently incorrect (see Section 11
C below, at 9 et seq.).

However, even the initial assumptions

of law are wrong.
A.

The Actual Intent of the Parties to the Security

Interest Determines Whether the Debt is Extinguished,
Not the Words Used in the Contract.
Proudfit case itself dealt with facts where the
third party intervening judgment lienor had no knowledge or
involvement in the transactions between the debtor and the
'.wlder of the Trust Deed.

Hoi;ever,

in finding that the renew 0 ·

note continued to be secured by the Trust Deed, this Court

-5-

t

l1dt

if

an unpaid debt is to be deemed extinguished, the

111ter1t of the parties must be shown.

See also, Oakman,

eind 59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 461, supra.
tl11s rule is sound.

Where the debt to the beneficiary under a

Trust Deed has never been paid,

the actual intent of the

parties to the Trust Deed should control.
favor a forfeiture.

The policy behind

The law does not

The continuation of the Trust Deed as

security for the renewal note does not place the intervening
11enholder in any worse position than he was prior to
acceptance of the renewal note by the beneficiary under the
1'rust Deed.

This is not a case where new money was advanced,

or where an additional indebtedness that did not previously
exist burdens the position of the intervening lien holder.
Thus,

the intent of the parties to the Trust Deed is

controlling.
Jones' attempts to support the proposition that the
intent is controlled by the language of the contract, by citing
cases that have nothing to do with the priority of security
interests in real estate (Jones Brief at 11-12).
tLe case of James Weller,

Inc. v. Hansen,

Jones cites

517 P.2d 410 (Ariz.

'l'he lleller case deals with the issue of whether a

Aµp.

1973).

loncJ

owner and a realtor were engaged in a joint venture so

'fiot

Lhe service of a lien claim on the construction company

-6-

constituted service on the realtor.
apparent authority in the law of agency,
as to third parties,

t!

1

,,

the land owner and the realtor were

engaged in a joint venture.
joint venturers,

the cuurt fuun<J

Obviously,

when persons act as

they will be bound by the knowledge of their

joint venturer even though the actual intent may be otherwise,
This theory is not analogous to the situation where Jones had
already taken its deed as security expressly subject to the
American Trust Deed, and American chose to rollover or renew
the Note, placing Jones in no worse position than Jones was
prior to the renewal.

The remaining two supporting cases c1te

on page 11 of Jones' Brief, do not warrant discussion.
Stearn and Lepel cases,

In the

the courts briefly discuss the issue oi

whether a husband and wife are engaged in a joint venture, and
the cases contain no discussion of real estate,

trust deeds or

intervening security interests.
B.

Assuming,

1:

arguendo,

that the Language of the

Written Agreements Controls Intent as to Third Parties, Jones
Was Not Such a Third Party.
It is undisputed that Jones took his deed expressly
subject to American's Trust Deed for $200,000.00 (R. at 19).
There i3 also no dispute that the indebtedness secured by
American's Trust Deed was rolled over in October and November.
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l ·'"''·

pri·ir to Jones taking his Deed.

Jones, admits that these

s in October, November and December did not extinguish
"'

1et1t

r:11et

at

to American or release the prior Trust Deed (see Jones
12-13).

Therefore, Jones took his deed subject to the

Trust Deed and the rollover procedure, which had already
occurred on two occasions.

The only function of the January

1981 Revised Agreement and Note was to formalize this rollover

procedure.
Additionally, even after the execution of the January
1981 Revised Agreement and Note, Jones continued to acknowledge

the validity and priority of the American Trust Deed.

On

February 16, 1981, Jones executed a Trust Deed to the Subject
Property in favor of a third party (R. 398-400), and the legal
description therein specifically recites that this conveyance
by

Jones was expressly subject to American's Trust Deed (R.

400).

As late as May 5, 1981, after American had recorded its

Notice of Default, Jones' attorney delivered written
instructions directing the recording of an escrowed warranty
deed from Jones to L. H. Investment upon certain conditions (R.
408),

c•.mt

1

which escrowed warranty deed expressly recites the
nuat ion of the American Trust Deed ( R.

396).

Jones was not an innocent third party without
hut took subject to the Trust Deed and the rollover procedure,

-8-

and acknowledged the validity of tl1e Trust Deed until almost
the commencement of th1s action to stop Amer1cdt1's
sale.
C.

Tne Express Language of the Revised Agreement ,

Note establishes the Clear Intent to Continue the Debt to
American and the Security of the Trust Deed.
Jones'

Brief at 12-13 states that the October 1980

Amendment to the original Commodities Purchase Agreement
remains secured by the September 1980 Trust Deed because the
October Amendment recited that it was supplemental to the
previous agreement,

whereas the January 1981 Revised Agreement

contains a boiler plate integration clause, which states that
the Agreement supersedes all prior agreements of the parties. '
Jones, however, completely ignores six distinct
provisions and aspects of the January Revised Agreement that
clearly indicate on the face of the documents that there

'·

intention to extinguish the prior debt or agreements or releas'
the Trust Deed security:

(1)

The original September 1980 Commodities

Purchase Agreement and the October Amendment thereto

also erroneously asserts at 13 that tne
January Revised Agreement recites full performance of the
original Commodities Purchase Agreement.
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ire ,ittached to

the Revised Agreement as Exhibit "A".

1See Recital Con page 1 of Revised Agreement
R.

293-301).

( 2)

Paragraph 29 on page 8 of the Revised

Agreement states that all Exhibits annexed to the
Revised Agreement are expressly made a part of the
Agreement.

"All references to this Agreement,.

shall deem to refer to and include this Agreement and
all such Exhibits and writings.

Any breach or default

under the provisions of any of such writings shall,
for all purposes, constitute a breach or default under
this Agreement and all other such writings."

Thus,

the prior agreements and debt were not only not
extinguished, but by the express language of paragraph
29,

were kept alive under the Revised Agreement and

could be the subject of a default.
( 3)

Paragraph 1 on page 2 of the Revised

Agreement specifically states that L. H.

Investment

"shall continue to apply the Two Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($200,000.00) advanced by American Coin.
(Emphasis Added).

Thus indicating no payment of the

$200,000.00 and no intent to extinguish this
underlying debt.

-10-

(4)

Paragraph 7 on pages 3 and 4 of the Revise

Agreement specifically recites that the September
Trust Deed to American "shall be extended and shrill
provide security for

the performance of all

obligations under this Agreement and Trust Deed
Note."

The intent is thus not only clear to

the debt, but to continue and "extend" the Trust Deea
Security for the underlying debt.
(5)

The fact that the January 1981 Agreement is

called a "Revised" Agreement indicates the intent of
the parties to continue the prior Agreement, with
certain modifications, and not an intent to
the entire debt and enter into a totally new
transaction.
( 6)

Recitals C through H of the Revised

Agreement outline the September 1980 Original
Commodities Purchase Agreement as well as the October,
November and December rollover's as a continuous
transaction,

and never indicate that there has been

°

payment or satisfaction of the underlying debt.
Importantly, Jones never attempts to show any
substantive differerce between the rollover procedures employe:
in October and November 1980, prior to the time Jones took

-11-

hi;

,

-

1

,-u,,J
-rnt'r1t

the procedure formalized in the January Revised

, 11,ver l-'rocedure
1,dd

Jones' argument is essentially that if the

and Note.

utilized in October, November and December

not been formalized by the January Revised Agreement, that

American's Trust Deed would continue to secure the $200,000.00
debt to this date, but that because of the written
formalization of the identical rollover procedure, the security
interest of American has somehow been lost.
Jones Brief at 13 argues that the execution of a new
promissory note in January, 1981 provides evidence that the
January Revised Agreement and Note were intended to extinguish
the underlying debt.

Of course, American's original brief

cited several cases where this court and other jurisdictions
hdve held that mere execution of a renewal note does not raise
the presumption that the debt has been extinguished (See
Appellant's Brief at 13-17).

However, Jones does not review

the provisions of the January 1981 Note, which clearly indicate
within the Note itself that the intent of the parties was not
to extinguish the debt or release the security interest (R.
2')0 -92):

(1)

Attached to the January Note were not only

the 1981 Revised Agreement, but also the original
Commodities Purchase Agreement and the October

-12-

Amendment.

The tlote recites in the second parayra 1 i

that it is given in acknowledyement of the sum of
$200,000.00 paid by American "in accordance with the

terms of the

attached hereto and marked

Exhibit "A".
( 2)

The last sentence in the second paragraph of

the Note states that the note shall be deemed paid in
full upon strict performance under the attached

( 3)

The third paragraph of the note speci ficallv

recites that it is secured by the September 1980 Trust
Deed.
(4)

The fact that the January Note was in the

face amount of $219,000.00 is of no consequence.

This

amount is merely the original $200,000.00
American, plus the $19,000.00 discount premium to be
paid pursuant to the terms of the original Commodities
Purchase Agreement.
The conclusion that the Revised Agreement and Note
were intended to extinguish the debt and security interest 1s
not only directly contrary to numerous provisions of the
Revised Agreement and Note. but is completely untenable in
light of the standards set forth in Proudfit:

--13-

Taking of a

,,.J.J

'i"'"'

1 note does

'°

not extinguish the debt unless such clearly

as the intent of the parties.

111. THE JANUARY 1981 REVISED AGREEMENT AND NOTE DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A FUTURE ADVANCE.
Point II of Jones Brief at 15-20 sets forth the red
herring "future advance" argument.

Jones argues that "since

the obligations under the original Commodities Purchase
Agreement were fully performed and the original.

Note

thereby fully paid," then the January Revised Agreement
constitutes a future advance of new debt that should not be
secu1ed under the Trust Deed's "dragnet clause".

This argument

is adequately addressed in American's original Brief at 18-19.
The underlying $200,000.00 indebtedness to American was never
paid, extinguished or released,
at all in January, 1981,

therefore there was no advance

future or otherwise.

American does

not rely on the dragnet clause of the Trust Deed.
All cases cited by Jones deal with the security for
advances of new, additional money by the lender subsequent to
an intervening lien.

This is not an issue in cases like the

present, dealiny with rollovers of debt or renewal notes.
Pr0ucl fit;

See

Oakman Hurd Lumber; Gray v. Kappos; Easton v. Ash;

_l11tc,rstilte Trust v.

Headlund, supra, and other cases cited

and in Appellant's Brief.
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Jones Brief at 12 states that the case •Jf Vall.'lb_ci_lt
Crown Plumbing and Sewer Service,

Inc.,

523 S.W.2d 72 (Tx.

App. 1975) has "facts strikingly similar to the present case.
In Vaughan, the mortgagee asserteu a prior security interest
for new loans and advances of money subsequent to the purchase
of the property by Crown, which were in add1t1on to the
original indebtedness.

In fact,

the mortgagee was the

mortgagor's attorney and one such alleged new advance was for
subsequent unpaid attorney's fees owed to the mortgagee.
at 74,

76.

The court found that these new subsequent loans

were not reasonably contemplated in the Trust Deed.
76-77.

Id.

Id. at

In the present case there was no new advance or

additional loan whatsoever, but only the original
indebtedness.

This unpaid $200,000.00 indebtedness to America:

was obviously within the contemplation of Jones when Jones too;.
his deed, because the deed by its express terms is subject to
the debt and Trust Deed.
In any event, the cases dealing with whether a dragn•
clause will cover a future advance,

state that the question is

whether such was intended by the parties.
Bank v. Shiew,

G09 P.2d 952,

See First Security

955-5G (Utah 1980) and other case'

cited in Appellant's Brief at 19.

At a

minimum,

right to a trial as to the intent of the parties.

-] 5-

American has

IV

THE PRINCIPLES
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION, EQUITABLE
SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE MORTGAGE REQUIRE THAT
AMERICAN kETAIN ITS SECURITY INTEREST.
It is unnecessary for American to rely upon equitable

doctrines to establish its security interest priority, because
ti1e secured indebtedness was never satisfied and the Revised
Agreement and Note expressly recite that they continue to be
secured by the Trust Deed.

Jones attacks the application of

Lhe equitable doctrines by again stating that L. H.

Investment

extinguished the debt by executing a renewal note, and thus
arguing that the equities favor Jones.
The principle behind the equitable doctrines is to do
justice between the parties.

American took a first Trust Deed

position and advanced $200,000.00, which was never repaid.
Jones took his deed with knowledge of, and expressly subject
to,

the American Trust Deed.

Jones never changed his position,

or in any way relied on an alleged extinguishrnent of the
Arner ican debt.

In fact, after the execution of the January

Revised Agreement,
party,

Jones executed a trust deed to a third

which trust deed's legal description again recited that

it was subject to American's trust deed.
1,1ter1t of oill partes,

(R. at 398-400).

including Jones, was to continue the

u11ur1ty of American's security interest.

-16-

The

V.

'fHE LOWER COURT'S SUllMARY ,JUDGMENT RU L HJG WAS rLlll
ERROR.
The result reached in the couct below was part1cu 1

inappropriate in light of the summary judgment posture of t,e
case.

American brought its summary judgment motion,

cross-motion from Jones.

'l'he Court,

wit11 n,,

in the order prepared bj

Jones' counsel, did not merely deny American's motion,

but

recited that the January 1981 Revised Agreement and Note were
not secured by the Subject Property.

Although the court

appeared willing to change this order on rehearing, by the
the court issued its order months later,
explanation,

the court, without

summarily denied American's Motion to Amend,

Vacate or Reconsider.
Jones argues that because counsel for American stated
in oral argument that there were no disputed facts to rule on
American's own Motion for Summary Judgment,

that somehow

American is estopped from now claiming that there are
facts when the court in effect granted Summary Judgment for
Jones.

To obtain Summary Judgment,

American only needed to

show non-payment of the under lying de ht,

and no ext i ngu i shment

of the debt or release of the Trust Deed would he presumed.
Oakman v. Hurd LuI'.lber and Woodwork Co.,

-1., _

at 921; Srn1_1:_l_e_

supra, "it 401; Marking Systems,

,,, ic;,

,L

c;upr a,

J,J,Jment,

at 1 7C.

However,

Inc. v.

Inten1est Film

for Jones to be granted Summary

Jones had to show the "clear" intent of the parties

extinguish the debt through execution of the Revised
and Note, because the debt was admittedly never
Proudfit, supra, at 124.

The intent of the parties to

extinguish the debt and release the Trust Deed was at a minimum
a disputed issue of fact.
Furthermore, the court's order that American had no
security interest in the Subject Property, leads to an absurd
result.

American has shown that Jones took his deed as a

security interest only in connection with a sale of diamonds by
Jones (see Appellant's Brief at 6).

Indeed, L. H. Investment

has instituted suit against Jones to declare the Jones deed
invalid (Third District Court, Civil No. C81-1858).

If Jones

has only a security interest in the Subject Property, then even
dssuming,

arguendo, that Jones security interest is prior to

American's, American still has an interest in the Subject
Property, because L. H. Investment, the grantor to both Jones
funerican, admits the validity of American's Trust Deed
while contesting the Jones' deed in a separate action.
H<>1<ever,
111y

the order appealed from completely divests American of

interest in the Subject Property.
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CONCLUSION
Jones never addresses the controlling fdcts and law
The debt to American was never paid, satisfied,
extinguished in any form.

released or

The 1981 Revised Agreement and Note

that Jones relies on to show the necessary intent to extinguish
the debt,

specifically attach and incorporate all prior

agreements,

recite the continuing obligations, and expressly

provide that they continue to be secured by the prior Trust
Deed.
American requests that this Court reverse the Summary
Judgment and the findings of the April 27, 1982 Order, with
directions to enter judgment in favor of American, or in the
alternative, vacate the Judgment and Order and remand this case
for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day of September,
1983.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

/(_/ -,- 7 ;0
Kent T. Anderson
Attorneys for Appellants

-19-

CERTIFICATE OF' HAND-DELIVERY
1 hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a
.,,, 'ind <eorrect copy of the foregoing Reply Brief on this the
7nd day of September, 1983 to David G. Williams, Esq., Snow,

& Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor, Salt
Lake

City, Utah

84110.

01 OlA

KTA

-20-

